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could affirm that Christians must show hospitality-body and soul--to the
stranger precisely because God commanded it. So even if Palmer's criticism
of Murphy is right (her view entails that we are "no more than our basic
chemistry"), nothing follows about the moral value of assisting others, con
veying dignity, etc. (p. 202). If God deems it good for us to assist and value
others, then it is indeed good (whatever our metaphysical makeup). Or
they may have a creation ethic: we must value the whole person body and/
or soul because God created the whole person (in God's image no less). Or
the authors may understand ethics in terms of human flourishing: humans
flourish only when they have adequate food, shelter and clothing and only
when they are properly related to their Source of light and life; hospitality
and forgiveness are key means to human flourishing. In this case, moral
ity is "built-in" to human nature in ways that any of the four competing
views could accommodate. Corcoran compellingly argues that views on
the metaphysics of persons are neutral with respect to a wide variety of
moral matters and that the relevant issues can be decided only by introduc
ing distinctly moral principles such as God's intentions (pp. 172-75).
Palmer's essay, however misguided, is instructive: most Christians are
asking questions about the nature of persons from a more pastoral or theo
logical point of view than are most philosophers. To me, all three points
of view -philosophical, pastoral and theological-are valid but all three
points of view may be asking fundamentally different questions about the
nature of persons. The mistake is to privilege any of these views and so to
discount the other. Should the authors wish to write a different book on
the nature of persons, they might therefore see fit to accommodate those
concerns. But this book is fine as it is and is highly recommended to any
one wishing to learn in a clear and concise manner four major views on
the nature of persons written by respected philosophers with uncharacter
istic modesty about just what they've thereby accomplished.

Galileo, Darwin, and Hawking: The Interplay of Science, Reason, and Religion,
by Phil Dowe. Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 2005. Pp. viii+205. $21.00
(paper).
JOSEPH JEDWAB, Oriel College, Oxford
The popular perception is that science and religion conflict. Phil Dowe, an
Australian metaphysician and philosopher of science, known for his con
tribution to the topic of causation, argues that there's no such conflict, but
rather a harmony, and indeed some interaction between them. The book's
content overlaps philosophy of science (realism and anti-realism, infer
ence to the best explanation, and determinism and indeterminism) and
philosophy of religion (miracles, cosmological arguments for theism, and
teleological arguments for theism). But the book best serves to introduce
the relation between science and religion. Dowe's prose is pellucid and
students, who want an introduction to the area, would do well to read the
book, not only for its rich historical, scientific, and philosophical content,
but for its calm and reasonable tone.
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Dowe introduces four models of the relation between science and reli
gion, based on Ian Barbour's typology: two conflict views (naturalism and
religious science) and two harmony views (independence and interaction).
Dowe considers a number of historical cases to decide the matter. He ar
gues that an open-minded look at these cases reveals a significant degree
of interaction, at least in the case of heliocentrism (Galileo), natural selec
tion (Darwin), and big bang cosmology (Hawking). Dowe draws an im
portant distinction here between philosophical and social conflict. Philo
sophical conflict is a conflict of claims, whereas social conflict is a conflict
of interests. One can exist without the other. And though there's been a fair
amount of social conflict, Dowe argues that there's been no real philosophi
cal conflict here. One should be clear about the different models of the rela
tion between science and religion. Dowe, as I said, follows Barbour's typol
ogy. But I think we can be more precise in some places. What is science?
And what is religion? These are difficult and much debated questions. For
our purposes each must at least involve some claims that are true or false.
There is, no doubt, more to science and religion than that, but there is at
least that much. For example, science says that there are quarks and elec
trons and the Christian religion says that there's a God. A conflict view
says that some claim of science and some claim of religion hinder each
other—either one is inconsistent with the other, or one makes the other
improbable, or one lowers the probability of the other, or hindrance takes
some other form. One version of the conflict view says that since there is
such conflict and the claim of science is well-supported, it defeats the claim
of religion. Another version of the conflict view says that since there is such
conflict and the claim of religion is well-supported, it defeats the claim of
science. A harmony view says that some claim of science and some claim
of religion don't hinder each other. One version says that some claim of
science and some claim of religion neither help nor hinder each other. An
other version says that some claim of science helps some claim of religion
or vice-versa—either one makes the other probable, or one raises the prob
ability of the other, or help takes some other form. Put this way, one might
hold all the models at once but for different areas of science and religion.
We could call the view that each model holds for different areas, the sibling
view: siblings are one moment worst enemies and the next moment best
friends. But this seems little different from the relation between one reli
gion and another or between one denomination and another within a reli
gion (e.g. the filioque controversy in the Orthodox and Catholic churches)
or between one science and another science or between one subdiscipline
and another within a science (e.g. general theory of relativity and quantum
theory). We should also make a distinction between a claim of science and
meta-science and a claim of religion and meta-religion. If religion claims
that we ought to do science, it is clear that in some sense religion promotes
science. But it doesn't follow that religion informs us of any claim of science—rather it informs us of some claim of meta-science. And if science
inspires religious feeling, it is clear that in some sense science promotes
religion. But it doesn't follow that science informs us of any claim of religion—rather it informs us of some claim of meta-religion.
There are excellent chapters on cosmology and how to interpret
scripture, realism and anti-realism in science and religion, the doctrine
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of God's image and how this relates to Francis Bacon's vision of science
and technology, David Hume's argument against miracles and George
Schlesinger's reply to it, Charles Darwin's theory of natural selection and
his interaction with the conservative Christian Asa Gray, big bang cos
mology, and God and chance. I'll give a taste of this last topic and then
make some comments on inference to the best explanation, which per
vades the book.
One of the most interesting chapters is the one on God and chance,
which is the topic of a forthcoming book by Dowe. Are providence and
chance compatible? Determinism is true if and only if the truth about
the state of the universe and the laws of nature at some time entail every
truth about the state of the universe at every later time. Indeterminism is
true if and only if determinism is false. Bell's Phenomenon in quantum
theory supports the claim that there's indeterminism in the world. (Don't
miss Dowe's humorous analogy of Bell's Phenomenon, which makes a
cultural allusion to the relatively colder weather in Tasmania and New
Zealand.) Providence concerns God's sustaining and directing of the
world. Dowe presents a Leibnizian version of absolute providence ac
cording to which God directly or indirectly causes every event for some
sufficient reason. So it looks like if there's chance, some events have no
cause, but if there's absolute providence, every event has a cause. We
can add, though Dowe doesn't, that if events can have a chancy cause, it
looks like if there's chance, some events have no cause or a chancy cause,
but if there's absolute providence, every event has a non-chancy cause.
What to say? Well, either God causes chance events or he doesn't. If God
causes chance events, then, though chance events have no physical cause,
they have a non-physical cause. Dowe notes that Bell's Phenomenon as
sumes locality, which says that two spatially separate things can't signal
each other faster than the speed of light. But locality doesn't apply to
God, who isn't in one place but not another. (We get out of this an in
teresting argument for theism, which Dowe doesn't endorse but offers
for consideration. As the Kalam Cosmological Argument says everything
that begins to exist has a cause, the universe begins to exist, so the uni
verse has a cause, so the Quantum Cosmological Argument says every
event has a cause, some events have no physical cause, so some events
have a non-physical cause.) If there are chance events but God doesn't
cause them, then, though this limits providence, one can still have a theo
logically adequate view of providence. A coincidence occurs if two or
more events occur together and that they occur together is both improb
able and without reason. Some coincidences are of significance but oth
ers aren't. An adequate view of providence doesn't require that there be
no meaningless coincidences. Likewise, if there are chance events of no
meaningful consequence, such a view of providence doesn't require that
there be no such events. So if chance leads to meaningful consequenc
es, providence implies that God causes chance events or that there are
no such events, but if chance doesn't lead to meaningful consequences,
providence doesn't so imply.
Dowe, in a number of places throughout the book, explains and uses
inference to the best explanation:
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(i) For two theories H and H' and evidence E, if P(H)>P(H') and P(E/
H)>P(E/H'), then infer H as the best explanation. (p. 48) But one should
qualify this as Dowe later does (p. 80): if H so compares to every rival
theory H', then infer H as the best explanation.
(ii) If H explains E, then H raises the probability of E (i.e. P(E/H)>P(E)).
And if H raises the probability of E, then E raises the probability of H (i.e.
P(H/E)>P(H)): (p. 80) Dowe says this last holds on the assumption that
the prior probability of H is about the same as the prior probability of E.
But Richard Swinburne, Epistemic Justification (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
2001), says the claim that P(H/E)>P(H) if and only if P(E/H)>P(E) follows
from Bayes' theorem on the assumption that the probability of H and E
are each non-zero, regardless of whether they are roughly the same (p.
104). And Dowe doesn't bring out how modest a claim it is that evidence
confirms a theory. E confirms H if and only if E raises the probability of
H (i.e. P(H/E)>P(H)). By contrast and much more strongly, E makes H
probable if only if H given E is more probable than not-H given E (i.e.
P(H/E)>P(~H/E)).
(iii) If E is more probable on H than on H' (i.e. P(E/H)>P(E/H')), then E
confirms H more than H'. (p. 99) And if H and H' have the same predic
tive power (i.e. P(E/H)=P(E/H')), H confirms E more than H' if and only
if H is simpler than H'. (p. 102) This seems right. Though scope is also
relevant, the most important factor for the intrinsic probability of a theory
is simplicity. Dowe notes the justification that George Schlesinger gives
for this principle: it is the only one that provides a unique candidate when
choosing among theories of equal predictive power. But this justification
is merely pragmatic. And besides that it is false: the rule that one should
select the second simplest theory also yields a unique candidate. Perhaps
the principle of simplicity has no justification. But if so, it's none the worse
for that. In this case, it's an inherently rational criterion to use in inference
to the best explanation.
(iv) Only causes explain (p. 153). One might qualify this and say that, in
the relevant sense of 'explain,' it's not a cause but a claim that cites a cause
that explains. And one might add that a description of why in the circum
stances the cause had its effect (e.g., a description of a law of nature) may
also enter explanation.
The publishers should be aware that there are a significant number of
errors that a proofreader should have spotted. I list some very minor cor
rections, which perhaps a future print can put right.
Psalm 58: p. 29n25
Kalam: pp. vi, 143 (x4), 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 186 (x2)
Craig, W. L.: p. 204
McMullin, E.: p. 204

